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What the Supreme Court is likely to do in the presently pending case Google v. Oracle.
By: Jennifer Campbell
I.

Introduction
Advances in technology, specifically relating to computer science, have evolved rapidly, and it

has been difficult for the law to keep up.1 The pending U.S. Supreme Court case, Google LLC v. Oracle
America, Inc., demonstrates some issues that have emerged in copyright law with the rapid growth of
technology in computer science.
In 2008, Google released its Android platform, software that Google and other manufacturers use
in smartphones and tablets.2 Since Android’s release, Google has produced over $42 billion in revenue
solely from the Android platform’s advertising.3 After Oracle America acquired Sun Microsystems in
2010, it filed suit against Google, alleging that Google’s Android platform infringed on Oracle’s Java SE
platform.4 The litigation between Oracle America and Google has been ongoing for a decade, and now the
litigation is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.5 The dispute stems from Google’s use of computer
programs, known as application programming interfaces, or API packages, written in the Java language to
develop the Android platform.6 Software interfaces, like the APIs at issue, are “functional systems or
methods of operating a computer program or platform” and “merely describe what functional tasks a
computer program will perform without specifying how it does so.”7 Software interfaces are organized by
what courts commonly refer to as the “structure, sequence, and organization.”8 The Java platform is an
innovative platform that was the first to allow computer programmers to write one program that could run

1

See Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992).
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1187-88 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
3
Id. at 1187.
4
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956),
2019 WL 338902.
5
See Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 2019 WL 338902; Google LLC
v. Oracle America, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019).
6
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
7
Brief Amici Curiae of 83 Computer Scientists in Support of Petitioner at 2-3, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.
(argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 2020 WL 242506.
8
Id. at 6.
2
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on multiple operating systems.9 Before Java, programmers had to rewrite their programs for each different
computer type.10
The first issue that arose in the litigation between Oracle and Google was whether the declaring
code and the overall structure, sequence, and organization of thirty-seven of Oracle’s API packages were
copyrightable.11 The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found that the API
packages at issue were not subject to copyright protection.12 Thereafter, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision concluding that the API packages were indeed subject
to copyright protection. The appellate court remanded the case back to the district court to determine
whether Google had a fair use defense under the Copyright Act.13 The remand led to a lengthy jury trial,
and the district court entered judgment in favor of Google finding the company’s use of the copyrighted
API material constituted fair use.14 On appeal, the Federal Circuit again reversed the district court’s
judgment, this time finding that Google’s use was not fair as a matter of law.15 Google petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 15, 2019.16 The two issues
presently pending in the Supreme Court are: (1) whether Java’s declaring code and the structure,
sequence, and organization of the APIs are copyrightable, and (2) whether Google’s use of the declaring
code and structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs constituted fair use, along with the Supreme
Court’s sua sponte request regarding the appropriate standard of review on the fair use issue.17
This article seeks to provide applicable principles, rules, statutes, and relevant case law relating to
copyrights. Additionally, this article details the circuit court splits on what is protectable expression in

9

Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1348.
Id.
11
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1347.
12
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d at 1002.
13
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d at 1347.
14
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
15
Id.
16
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020) (No. 18-956), 2019
WL 338902; Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 520 (2019).
17
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc. (argued Oct. 7, 2020); Google LLC v. Oracle
America, Inc., No. 18-956, 2020 U.S. LEXIS 2621 (May 4, 2020).
10
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computer programs. This article further discusses the Federal Circuit’s Oracle America, Inc. v. Google
Inc. and Oracle America Inc. v. Google LLC opinions, analyzing what the Federal Circuit got right in its
judgment and what it got wrong. Finally, this article considers the likely approach and conclusions of the
Supreme Court’s upcoming, long-awaited opinion.
II.

Background
Copyrightability of Software Interfaces

Concepts and Principles of Copyright Law
The drafters of the United States Constitution gave Congress the power to enact laws to protect
the “exclusive rights” of authors in their original works.18 Pursuant to the Copyright Act of 1976, original
literary works of authorship, among others, receive copyright protection.19 When Congress enacted the
Copyright Act of 1976, the legislative history explains that Congress included computer programs to the
category of literary works, but only to the extent that the computer program incorporates the author’s
original expression of the idea and not the idea itself.20
Copyright law intends to protect an author’s creative, original expression of an idea but does not
protect the underlying idea itself.21 As early as 1879, the Supreme Court conveyed the idea-expression
dichotomy principle in Baker v. Selden.22 When enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress codified
the idea-expression dichotomy, stating that copyright protection in an original work of authorship does
not “extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”23 The

18

See U.S. Const., art. I, §8.
See 17 U.S.C. §102(a).
20
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
21
Id. at 56-57.
22
101 U.S. 99, 102-03, 107 (1879) (explaining that the copyright protects the author’s expression of how the
accounting system is used but it does not protect others from using the accounting system as the author has
explained it or from creating a book explaining the same accounting system).
23
17 U.S.C. §102(b).
19
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legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 reflects concerns relating to the extent of copyright
protection in computer programs. Congress attempted to address these concerns by explaining that a
programmer’s expression is the copyrightable element of the computer program, and the “actual process
or methods embodied in the program” are not copyrightable.24
Sometimes, an author’s original expression is not divisible from the idea. Pursuant to the merger
doctrine, an idea and the idea’s expression merge when there are one or very few ways of expressing the
idea.25 In a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, a gas pipeline company brought a copyright infringement
suit against a competitor, alleging that the competitor copied its proposed route of a natural gas pipeline
as depicted on a map that the company created.26 The appellate court agreed with the district court’s
holding that “the idea of the location of the pipeline” and its expression of that pipeline on a map are
inseparable and that the map expressed “the only effective way the idea of the location of the pipeline.”27
Thus, the route of the proposed pipeline was not copyrightable because the idea and expression merged.28
To determine whether an idea and expression have merged, courts must look at whether there are multiple
ways to express the idea in question.29 If a court determines that the idea and the expression of the idea
are indivisible, then the merger doctrine is applicable, and the expression of that idea is not protectable by
copyright.30
Another important concept in copyright law relates to the copyrightability of compilations.31 An
author’s work must be original to receive copyright protection.32 Facts are not original, and therefore, not
copyrightable.33 Although factual compilations may include some originality, that originality does not
24

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 57 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670.
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983).
26
Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1461 (5th Cir. 1990).
27
Id. at 1363-64.
28
Id.
29
Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 138-39 (5th Cir. 1992).
30
Id. at 139.
31
The Copyright Act defines a compilation as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship.” 17 U.S.C. §101.
32
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
33
Id. at 347.
25
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extend to the facts, but rather the author’s selection and arrangement of those facts, so long as the author
independently chose the selection and arrangement of the facts and the selection and arrangement involve
a “minimal degree of creativity.”34 Only the author’s selection or arrangement is considered original and
protectable by copyright law.35 In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., a telephone
utility company brought a copyright infringement action against a publisher of telephone directories,
alleging that the publisher copied the utility company’s white page listings from its telephone directory.36
The utility company asserted that the sweat of the brow doctrine37 applied, which meant that, instead of
the publisher copying the listings from the utility company’s telephone directory, the publisher was
required to go door-to-door to obtain that information.38 The Supreme Court rejected the sweat of the
brow approach to copyright protection, stating that “originality, not ‘sweat of the brow,’ is the touchstone
of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works.”39 Thereafter, the Supreme Court
concluded that the information provided in the telephone utility company’s telephone directory was
uncopyrightable facts.40 Finally, the Court determined that the telephone directory lacked originality in
the coordination and arrangement of those facts, that the arrangement of names in alphabetical order
lacked any degree of creativity, and that such an arrangement is commonplace in telephone directories.41
U.S. Circuit Court Approaches to Determine What is Protectable Expression in Computer Programs
The United States Courts of Appeals do not uniformly agree on how to determine what is
protectable expression in computer programs. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Sixth
Circuits’ view is that 17 U.S.C. §102(b)42 precludes copyright protection of expression since the
34

Id. at 348.
Id. at 350.
36
Id. at 344.
37
The underlying notion of the sweat of the brow doctrine “was that copyright was a reward for the hard work that
went into compiling facts.” Id. at 352.
38
Id. at 344.
39
Id. at 359-60.
40
Id. at 361.
41
Id. at 362-63.
42
Section 102(b) states, “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” 17 U.S.C. §102(b).
35
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expression is contained in forms that are not copyrightable, such as procedures, processes, or methods of
operation.43 Meanwhile, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s view is that 17 U.S.C. §102(b)
does not preclude copyright protection so long as there are multiple ways to express the idea.44 Finally,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit takes an entirely different approach by applying an
abstraction-filtration-comparison test.45
In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit’s case, Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland
International, Inc., the parties disputed whether Lotus’s menu command hierarchy was copyrightable.46
The lower court initially took a similar approach to the Third Circuit’s approach, concluding that because
the Lotus developers had a variety of choices on how to structure the menu command hierarchy and a
choice of words to use in the menu, consequently the menu command hierarchy constituted copyrightable
expression.47 However, the First Circuit focused not on whether the copied material was expression, but
whether it was protectable under 17 U.S.C. §102(b).48 In doing so, the court rejected the Second Circuit’s
abstraction-filtration-comparison test, concluding that, since the test only applies to nonliteral copying,
the test would be of little assistance with the instant issue of literal copying.49 The court concluded that
the menu command hierarchy was a method of operation and, thus, uncopyrightable.50 After the First
Circuit’s ruling, Lotus petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. The High Court granted
certiorari, and an equally divided Court affirmed the First Circuit’s judgment.51
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit came to a similar conclusion as the First Circuit
in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. Similar to Lotus, Lexmark dealt with

See Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) aff’d, 516 U.S. 233
(1996); Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
44
See Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
45
See Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
46
49 F.3d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1995) aff’d, 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
47
Id. at 811.
48
See Id. at 815.
49
Id. at 814-15.
50
Id. at 815.
51
See Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
43
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the literal copying of aspects of a computer program, specifically an exact copy of Lexmark’s Toner
Loading Program.52 Also similar to Lotus, the lower court in Lexmark deemed the program copyrightable
because a programmer could write it in various ways.53 The Sixth Circuit discussed the two-prong test for
analyzing a copyright infringement claim.54 The first prong, which looks at the ownership of a valid
copyright, “tests the originality and non-functionality of the work.”55 In the second prong, a court asks
whether the defendant copied protectable elements of the work; this prong tests whether copying occurred
and if so, whether the copied portions were protectable under copyright.56 The appellate court determined
that the lower court erred in its reasoning under the second prong and explained that to determine if
originality exists, a “court should ask whether the ideas, methods of operation and facts of the program
could have been expressed in any form other than that chosen by the programmer, taking into
consideration the functionality, compatibility and efficiency demanded of the program.”57 The court’s
determination implied that expression falling under any of the categories in 17 U.S.C. §102(b) precludes
copyright protection.58
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit takes a contrary approach from the First and
Sixth Circuits. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., a dispute arose about the
similarities between the structure and organization of two programs used in dental laboratories.59
However, the code in the programs was not the same.60 The lower court determined that the defendant did
not create his program independently, that he had access to the plaintiff’s program, and that the two
programs were substantially similar to one another, concluding that the defendant infringed on the
plaintiff’s copyright.61 The court set out to determine whether the structure of a program was

52

387 F.3d 522, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 531.
54
Id. at 534.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 539.
58
See Id.
59
797 F.2d 1222, 1228-29 (3d Cir. 1986).
60
Id. at 1233.
61
Id.
53
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copyrightable.62 In answering that question, the court used the Baker v. Selden reasoning to conclude that
“the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s idea, and everything that is not
necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the idea.”63 The court further
explained its conclusion by stating, “[w]here there are various means of achieving the desired purpose,
then the particular means chosen is not necessary to the purpose; hence, there is expression, not idea.”64
The court proceeded to apply the rule it created, which the court stated has its “greatest force in the
analysis of utilitarian or ‘functional’ works,” to conclude that the structure of the program was part of the
programmer’s expression and was not the programmer’s idea of the program.65
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit takes an entirely different approach from the
First, Sixth, and Third Circuits. In Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., the plaintiff
initially sued the defendant for literal copying of the code of the plaintiff’s program, ADAPTER, in the
defendant’s program OSCAR 3.4.66 The defendant did not learn of the code copying until receiving the
plaintiff’s complaint, but one of the defendant’s employees, who was a former employee of the plaintiff,
confirmed the copying as true.67 The defendant then rewrote its OSCAR 3.4 program to exclude any
portion of the code copied from ADAPTER.68 The rewritten OSCAR 3.4, named OSCAR 3.5, then
sparked the plaintiff to file a separate, new copyright infringement claim arising from non-literal elements
of ADAPTER that the OSCAR 3.5 program purportedly took.69 The lower court found that OSCAR 3.5’s
structure, including its non-literal elements, was not substantially similar to ADAPTER.70 The plaintiff
appealed the decision, claiming that the lower court failed to find that copyright protects the expression in
non-literal elements of a computer program.71 The appellate court began with a lengthy analysis of

62

Id. at 1234.
Id. at 1236.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1238-39.
66
982 F.2d 693, 700 (2d Cir. 1992).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 701.
70
Id. at 696-97.
71
Id. at 702.
63
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copyright law, including Baker v. Selden.72 From its analysis, the court concluded that “elements of a
computer program that are necessarily incidental to its function are . . . unprotectable.”73 From there, the
court formulated its abstraction-filtration-comparison test to determine how to separate an idea in a
computer program from its expression.74 In the first step of the test, “abstraction,” a court is to dissect the
plaintiff’s copyrighted work’s structure and “isolate each level of abstraction contained within it,” starting
with the code and ending with “an articulation of the program’s ultimate function.”75 The second step,
“filtration,” separates the protectable expression from any non-protectable elements by examining the
levels of abstraction “to determine whether their particular inclusion at that level was ‘idea’ or was
dictated by considerations of efficiency, so as to be necessarily incidental to that idea; required by factors
external to the program itself; or taken from the public domain and hence is nonprotectable expression.”76
The court elaborated that oftentimes, a programmer’s choice in design is made by external factors such
as:
(1) the mechanical specification of the computer on which a particular program is
intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs with which a program
is designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’ design standards; (4)
demands of the industry being served; and (5) widely accepted programming practices
within the computer industry.77

The third and final step in the test is “comparison.”78 In the comparison step, after the court has filtered
out all nonprotectable elements in the program, the court compares the remaining protectable expression
in the plaintiff’s copyrighted program to the defendant’s alleged infringing program for substantial
similarity.79

72

Id. at 702-05.
Id. at 705.
74
Id. at 706.
75
Id. at 707.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 709-10.
78
Id. at 710.
79
Id. at 710-11.
73
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit appears to have endorsed the Second Circuit’s
abstraction-filtration-comparison test as the proper approach.80 In the court’s fair use analysis, it criticized
the Third Circuit’s approach in Whelan as being “simplistic and overbroad,” pointing out that a program
is an intricate set of subroutines, which are in themselves programs, and each subroutine has its own idea,
making the Whelan approach inadequate.81 The court then analyzed the Second Circuit’s approach,
concluding that “in light of the essentially utilitarian nature of computer programs, the Second Circuit’s
approach is an appropriate one.”82
The Fair Use Doctrine
Although copyright holders have exclusive rights to their original expression, there are limitations
to their exclusive rights.83 One of those limitations is fair use.84 According to 17 U.S.C. §107, if the use of
a copyrighted work is fair, then using the copyrighted work is not infringement. The statute also provides
a non-comprehensive list of purposes in which the use could be deemed fair: “for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”85 The statute also provides
courts with four factors that they must include when determining whether the use was fair:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.86

80

See Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1524-25.
82
Id. at 1525.
83
See 17 U.S.C. §107.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
81
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As the statute’s use of the term “shall include” indicates, and as the legislative history explains, courts can
consider other relevant factors besides the four that the statute lists when determining fair use.87 The
legislative history further explains that codifying the defense of fair use to copyright infringement claims
was not intended to limit the scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use, which is where the doctrine
originated, nor to “change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.”88
Factor One: The Purpose and Character of the Use
The first factor in a court’s fair use analysis is the purpose and character of the use.89 In 1984, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that if the copied material is for a commercial or profit-making purpose,
then the use would presumptively be unfair.90 The following year, the Supreme Court solidified the
presumption and again stated that “[t]he fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is
a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.”91 The Court elaborated on the
presumption by explaining that the commercial purpose should focus on whether the copier will profit
from exploiting the copyrighted material without paying the established price instead of the motive being
solely for monetary gain.92 Then, in 1994, the Supreme Court seemed to draw back on their presumption
that works of a commercial purpose are presumptively unfair.93 Furthermore, the Court stated that
commercial or nonprofit purpose is only one of the elements in the first-factor inquiry of fair use and that
if the factor hinged on that one element, then many of the purposes in the statute would fail as they tend to
be done for a profit.94 The Court’s factor one inquiry focused more on whether the copying work was
transformative from the original.95 A transformative work does not supplant the original, but rather “adds
something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,

87

H.R. Rep. No. 102-836, at 1 (1992), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2553.
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5680.
89
17 U.S.C. §107(1).
90
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-49 (1984).
91
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985.)
92
Id.
93
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-84 (1994).
94
Id. at 584.
95
Id. at 578-83.
88
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meaning, or message.”96 The Court also noted that finding that a work is not transformative does not
always go against a finding of fair use.97 In the Campbell case, the Court found that although a parody has
a commercial purpose, the work was transformative, which pulled the first factor more toward a finding
of fair use.98
Factor Two: The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor in a fair use analysis is the nature of the copyrighted work.99 “This factor calls
for recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with
the consequence that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied.”100 This
means that the more creative an author’s original expression, like a fictional novel, the stronger the
copyright protection, and the less creative, like a factual compilation, the “thinner” the copyright
protection.101 In the Court’s analysis of the second factor in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., it appears
that instead of looking at the nature of the copyrighted work as a whole, the Court focused on the
particular parts of the work copied and weighed the expressive elements taken against the facts taken, in
which the Court concluded that the use of the expressive elements went beyond what was necessary to
convey the facts.102

Factor Three: The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used

96

Id. at 579.
Id.
98
Id. at 578-85, 594.
99
17 U.S.C. §107(2).
100
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
101
See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237-38 (1990); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340, 349 (1991).
102
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563-63 (1985).
97
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The third factor in a fair use analysis is the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.103 The analysis looks at the quantity of the plaintiff’s
copyrighted work that the defendant’s work used in relation to the whole of the plaintiff’s copyrighted
work.104 The analysis also looks at the quality of the plaintiff’s work that the defendant’s work used.105
The Supreme Court stated that a relevant question to this analysis is whether the defendant copied “a
substantial portion” of the defendant’s work exactly from the plaintiff’s original work.106 If the defendant
did copy a substantial portion from the plaintiff’s original work, it could indicate that the defendant’s
work is more likely to take the place of the use and demand for the plaintiff’s original work.107 However,
a court could still find fair use even when a defendant copies the entire work.108 Furthermore, the third
factor may not weigh against the defendant, so long as the defendant takes no more than what is necessary
for use in the defendant’s work.109 The third-factor analysis uses as a qualitative element the importance
of the material copied from the original work.110 In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court agreed with the
district court’s evaluation of the copied work’s qualitative character from the original.111 The Supreme
Court found that the copied work used “what was essentially the heart of the book,” even though the
portion in the copied work was a quantitatively insubstantial portion of the original work.112
Factor Four: Market and Value Effects
The fourth factor in a fair use analysis is the effect of the use upon the potential market for the
copyrighted work or the effect on the value of the copyrighted work.113 In analyzing the fourth factor, a
court must look at the extent of the market harm that the copied work produced and whether the copier’s

103

17 U.S.C. §107(3).
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
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conduct in copying the original would impact the potential market for the original work.114 The analysis
must also take into account the market harm for derivative works.115 According to the Supreme Court, the
market for potential derivative uses of the original “includes only those that creators of original works in
general develop or license others to develop.”116 Additionally, transformative uses weigh into the fourthfactor analysis because when a work is transformative, market substitution for the original work is less
certain, and market harm may be less apparent.117 According to the Second Circuit, courts should balance
the fourth factor between the public’s benefit if the use is allowed and the “personal gain the copyright
owner will receive if the use denied.”118 Furthermore, the Second Circuit succinctly noted that “were a
court automatically to conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues were impermissibly
impaired simply because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, the fourth
fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.”119
Standard of Review for the Fair Use Doctrine
“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact,” which an appellate court may decide if the lower
court has found facts sufficient to evaluate the fair use factors.120 Mixed questions differ from one
another.121 The Supreme Court has elaborated that when an issue happens to be somewhere between a
legal standard and a fact, then the standard of review “often reflects which ‘judicial actor is better
positioned’ to make the decision.”122 When it is necessary to expand on a legal standard in a mixed
question, appellate courts should conduct a de novo review123 of the lower court’s decision.124 However,
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an appellate court should review the lower court’s decision with deference125 when the mixed question
pertains to case-specific factual issues that require the lower court to weigh the evidence and “make
credibility judgments.”126 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that when a “district court has found
facts sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors,” then it is not necessary for an appellate court to
remand for further factfinding, and the appellate court may conclude as a matter of law whether the
copied work qualifies as fair use of the copyrighted work.127 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has
concluded that when a record is sufficient to evaluate each fair use factor, then the appellate court “may
reweigh on appeal the inferences to be drawn from that record.”128
Oracle America, Inc. v. Google LLC
Background and Facts
After developing the Java platform, Sun Microsystems, Inc. (“Sun”) released it in 1996.129 Oracle
America, Inc. (“Oracle”) purchased Sun in 2010.130 Before Java, computer programmers had to write
different versions of the programs they created to run on different operating systems, such as Windows
and macOS.131 Java alleviated computer programmers’ burden by allowing them to create a program that
runs on all the different types of computers, through the Java platform, without rewriting the code for
each operating system.132 Java’s motto is “write once, run anywhere.”133

Deferential review is “[a]n appellate standard granting relief from a lower court’s. . . judgment only when earlier
proceeding entailed an unreasonable application of clearly established law or a clearly unreasonable determination
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Sun created the Java language to write programs on the Java platform.134 The Java language, like
other programming languages, is a written language that is “human-readable.”135 However, the humanreadable code, called “source code,” is not readable by computer hardware.136 Computers instead read
what is called “object code,” which is most commonly written in a binary language consisting of only 1s
and 0s.137 Thus, for a computer to read a computer program’s source code, it must be converted into
object code.138
Java 2 Standard Edition, commonly referred to as “Java SE,” is the name of the Java platform at
issue, which includes, among other things, the Java Application Programming Interface (“API”).139 “The
Java API is a collection of ‘pre-written Java source code programs for common and more advanced
computer functions.’”140 The APIs allow computer programmers to use the pre-written code to perform
common functions without writing the code from scratch; they are shortcuts that computer programmers
can use when writing a program.141 The pre-written codes are organized into groups called “packages.”142
Each package contains “methods,” which are the pre-written code for a specific function.143 The methods
within a package are sorted into “classes,” the classes group similar methods together.144 Likewise, the
packages group related classes together.145 A good analogy of the organization is: “Oracle’s collection of
API packages is like a library, each package is like a bookshelf in the library, each class is like a book on
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the shelf, and each method is like a how-to chapter in a book.”146 The Java platform contains more than
6,000 methods that are sorted into over 600 classes that are grouped into 166 API packages.147
Packages contain two types of source code: the declaring code and the implementing code.148
Computer programmers use a “call” to conjure the associated method.149 The call is connected to the
method by the declaring code.150 If a call is not written exactly as required, it will not pull up the
corresponding declaration, and thus, not work.151 The declaring code (the “declaration” or the “header”) is
“the expression that identifies the prewritten function,” and it “introduces the method body and specifics
very precisely the inputs, name and other functionality.”152 The declaring code directs the computer to
execute the implementing code associated with the specific declaring code.153 The implementing code is
the instructions to the computer to execute a specific function.154 Implementing code can be written in
various ways, unlike the declaring code.155
Oracle owns copyrights in Java SE, including in the API packages.156 However, the Java language
itself is free to use without permission.157 For a programmer to write using the Java language, the
programmer must use “62 classes (and some of their methods), spread across three packages within the
Java library.”158 Without the use of the sixty-two classes, the Java language will not work.159 Besides
using the sixty-two classes, programmers can write their own prewritten code packages to perform
various functions.160 Oracle offers three different licenses on its copyrighted material: a General Public
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License, a Specification License, and a Commercial License.161 The General Public License is an opensource license that allows programmers to use the declaring and implementing codes for free.162 However,
the programmer must give back to the public any innovations the programmer makes to the code.163 The
Specification License allows the licensee to use the declaring code and the structure of the API packages,
but the licensee must write the implementing code.164 Finally, the Commercial License allows businesses,
in exchange for royalties, to use all of the copyrighted material while keeping any code the business
creates secret.165 Both the Specification and Commercial Licenses require that any programs created with
the license be compatible with the Java platform.166
In 2005, Google and Sun began negotiations to license the use of the Java platform to create
Google’s mobile platform, Android.167 The negotiations failed “because Google wanted device
manufacturers to be able to use Oracle’s APIs in Android for free with no limits on modifying the code,
which would jeopardize the ‘write once, run anywhere’ philosophy.”168 Google nevertheless decided to
use Java when creating its Android platform.169 In doing so, Google copied the declaring code of thirtyseven API packages, which equates to 11,500 lines of copyrighted code, and the structure, sequence, and
organization of the API packages.170 When comparing Java’s thirty-seven API packages, including the
declaring and implementing code, to Google’s thirty-seven API packages, the code that Google copied
constitutes only three percent of the total code in Java’s thirty-seven API packages.171 Google’s Android
platform contains 168 API packages, which includes the thirty-seven copied packages.172 Google used the
specific thirty-seven API packages because it assumed that “programmers would want to find the same 37
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sets of functionalities in the new Android system callable by the same names as used in Java.”173
Google’s use of the thirty-seven sets allowed Android to be, in a way, interoperable with Java, meaning
that programmers could use their knowledge of the Java calls to write programs both for desktops, which
the Java platform runs on, and smartphones, which the Android platform runs on.174 Even though Google
used the Java language to write Android, Android is not compatible with the Java platform, which implies
that applications and programs that a programmer writes for Android will not run on Java and vice
versa.175
By using the thirty-seven API packages, Google “reimplemented” Java’s interfaces.176
Reimplementation is “[t]he process of writing new software to perform certain functions of a legacy
product.”177 Free reimplementation of software interfaces is a long-standing practice that is important for
“innovation and competition in software.”178 When a programmer reimplements an interface, it must
maintain the structure, sequence, and organization of the interface.179 Otherwise, the interface would be
incompatible and not interoperable.180
In 2008, phones with the Android platform began selling to consumers.181 Since their release,
Android smartphones have grown in popularity and comprise “a large share of the United States
market.”182 The Android platform is free for manufactures.183 Instead of charging manufacturers to use the
Android platform, Google generates revenue through advertising.184 The release of the free Android
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platform affected Oracle’s licensing.185 Amazon had initially licensed Java for its Kindle tablet, but then
switched to Android when it released another generation of its Kindle tablet, and thereafter, Amazon
leveraged Android against Oracle to get a large discount to use the Java platform again.186
Litigation Between Oracle America and Google in the Federal District and Circuit Courts
In 2010, a few months after Oracle acquired Sun, Oracle filed a suit against Google in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting seven claims of patent infringement
and one claim of copyright infringement.187 Oracle withdrew five of the seven patent infringement claims,
and the remaining two claims went to a jury who ultimately found against Oracle.188 Oracle’s copyright
claim asserted that Google copied Java API declarations, along with the structure, sequence, and
organization of the API.189
The district court conducted a two-week trial.190 The trial occurred in two phases.191 The first
phase was on copyrightability, copyright infringement, and equitable defenses.192 The second phase was
on patent infringement.193 For phase one, the parties agreed that the Judge would decide the issues of
copyrightability and equitable defenses asserted by Google, and the jury would decide the issues of
copyright infringement and fair use.194
The jury received instructions to consider that the structure, sequence, and organization of the
API packages at issue were copyrightable.195 While that was not the actual legal conclusion, the
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instruction intended to prevent an expensive retrial if the case underwent an appeal and reversal.196
Instead, the appellate court could simply reinstate the jury verdict.197 The jury returned a verdict in favor
of Oracle, finding that “Google infringed Oracle’s copyrights in the 37 Java packages,” but the jury was
“deadlocked on Google’s fair use defense.”198 Oracle then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law
on the issue of fair use, which the district court denied.199 Afterward, the district court issued a
preliminary decision, finding that the copied material in the thirty-seven API packages, which included
the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization, were not copyrightable because they
were a method of operation, and as such, are not copyrightable elements under 17 U.S.C. §102(b).200 The
district court also found that there was only one way to write the declaring code, and therefore, the merger
doctrine applied, which barred copyright ownership to the expression.201 Furthermore, the district court
“found that the declaring code was not protectable because ‘names and short phrases cannot be
copyrighted.’”202 Thereafter, the district court entered final judgment in favor of Google on the copyright
infringement claims relating to the thirty-seven API packages.203 Oracle then appealed the rulings that the
court entered against it in the final judgment, and Google cross-appealed the rulings the court entered
against it in the final judgment.204
The appeal went to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit because the suit
included patent claims and the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over any suit that includes patent claims.205
The Federal Circuit, however, applied Ninth Circuit law to the appeal because, “’[w]hen the questions on
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appeal involve law and precedent on subjects not exclusively assigned to the Federal Circuit, the court
applies the law which would be applied by the regional circuit.’”206
The Federal Circuit first looked at whether the declaring code was entitled to copyright protection
under the merger doctrine and short phrases doctrine.207 The appellate court concluded that the merger
doctrine does not apply because there were alternative expressions available to Oracle when Oracle
created the code.208 Further, the appellate court stated that the district court failed to ask the correct
question regarding the doctrine of short phrases.209 “The question is not whether a short phrase or a series
of short phrases can be extracted from the work, but whether the manner in which they are used or strung
together exhibits creativity.”210 The appellate court reasoned that the declaring codes are not specific
words or short phrases but are instead, 7,000 lines of declaring code, and the declaring codes expressed
creativity in the selection and arrangement of the declarations.211 The appellate court then concluded that
the district court erred in applying the short phrases doctrine to find that the declaring codes are not
protectable under copyright law.212
The appellate court then reviewed the district court’s finding that the structure, sequence, and
organization of the Java API packages are not copyrightable because they are a method of operation,
which cannot be copyrighted under 17 U.S.C. §102(b), even if the API packages are creative and
original.213 The appellate court stated that the district court’s reasoning was not based on Ninth Circuit
law but, instead, on First Circuit law that the Ninth Circuit had not adopted.214 The appellate court then
provided the correct Ninth Circuit law, which states that “the structure, sequence, and organization of a
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computer program is eligible for copyright protection where it qualifies as an expression of an idea, rather
than the idea itself.”215 Applying Ninth Circuit law, the appellate court found that the structure, sequence,
and organization was creative and original and that the declaring code could have been written in a
variety of ways while still achieving the same functions.216 Therefore, the court concluded that 17 U.S.C.
§102(b) does not bar copyright protection on the code.217
Finally, Oracle argued on appeal that the appellate court should find Google’s use of the
copyrighted material not to be fair use as a matter of law.218 The appellate court found that neither the
lower court nor the jury had made findings of fact that would allow the appellate court to assess the
question of whether Google’s use of the API packages was fair.219 Namely, the appellate court found that
there were disputed facts of whether Google’s use of the copyrighted work was transformative, whether
Google’s desire to make the Android platform interoperable weighs into the fair use factors, and whether
the release of Android harmed Java’s market.220 The appellate court remanded the proceedings to the
district court for further proceedings to determine Google’s fair use defense.221
After the Federal Circuit’s opinion, Google petitioned for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court on
the copyrightability issue.222 The Supreme Court ultimately denied certiorari.223
Upon remand to the district court, the court had a second jury trial on the issue of fair use.224 The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Google on its fair use defense.225 Thereafter, Oracle filed a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, which the district court denied and entered final judgment in favor of
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Google.226 Oracle then filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and a motion for a new
trial.227 The district court denied both motions, and Oracle appealed the denial along with the final
judgment and prior denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law.228 Google also cross-appealed to
preserve its claim as to copyrightability that the prior Federal Circuit opinion decided.229
Again, the appeal went to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.230 On appeal,
Oracle argued that all four of the statutory fair use factors weighed against a finding of fair use, namely
that: (1) Google’s use was solely commercial, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work is highly creative,
(3) Google copied more than what was necessary to write in the Java language, and (4) Android harmed
Oracle since Oracle’s customers stopped licensing Java and switched to the Android platform.231 The
appellate court first looked at the standard of review for the issue of fair use and concluded:
whether the court applied the correct legal standard to the fair use inquiry is a question
[the appellate court] review[s] de novo, whether the findings relating to any relevant
historical facts were correct are questions which [the appellate court] review[s] with
deference, and whether the use at issue is ultimately a fair one is something [the appellate
court] also review[s] de novo.232

The appellate court proceeded to state that, besides the jury’s implied findings of historical fact, all the
jury’s other findings relating to fair use are advisory.233
Thereafter, the appellate court applied the four fair use factors.234 The appellate court found that
the first-factor analysis of the purpose and character of Google’s use of the API packages was
“overwhelmingly commercial” and that Google’s use was not transformative, concluding that both of
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those factors weighed against a finding of fair use.235 The appellate court also reviewed the jury’s implied
finding that Google’s use was not in bad faith for the first-factor analysis, and found that the factor does
not weigh in Google’s favor, only a finding of bad faith would weigh against Google.236 As to factor two,
the nature of the copyrighted work, the appellate court found that “reasonable jurors could have
concluded that functional considerations [of the declarations and structure, sequence, and organization of
the API packages] were both substantial and important,” and concluded that factor two weighed in favor
of a finding of fair use.237 The factor three analysis on the amount and substantiality of the portion used,
the appellate court found that even if the jury found that Google copied only a small fraction of Java SE, a
reasonable jury could not find that “what was copied was qualitatively insignificant,” and the court
concluded that the third factor is at best neutral to a finding of fair use, but that it could also weigh against
a finding of fair use.238 Finally, in the fourth-factor analysis, the appellate court found evidence of actual
market harm, which no reasonable jury could have concluded otherwise, and that there was potential
market harm for derivative works.239 The appellate court, therefore, concluded that the fourth factor
weighed against a finding of fair use.240 Thereafter, the appellate court weighed all four factors and
concluded that Google’s use of the copyrighted material was not fair as a matter of law and remanded the
proceeding for a trial to determine the amount of damages.241
After the Federal Circuit found against Google’s fair use defense, Google petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari.242 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on November 15, 2019, and the
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on October 7, 2020.243
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III.

Discussion

What the Federal Circuit Likely Got Right
Although the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit misinterpreted some
case law and misconstrued some of the facts to reach legal conclusions, the U.S. Supreme Court will
likely find that the Federal Circuit was correct on some of its conclusions. The Federal Circuit’s holding
that Java’s declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs were copyrightable
was likely the correct conclusion, at least as to some aspects they are copyrightable. The Federal Circuit
appears to give the structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs full copyright protection, but it
should only be entitled to a thin copyright. The structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs are
similar to the selection and arrangement of the telephone directory in Feist Publications, Inc v. Rural
Telephone Service Co.244 In both the telephone directory and the structure, sequence, and organization of
the APIs, the creator decided how to organize the information.245 However, in the case of the telephone
directory, the organizational scheme of the directory was in no way original and was commonplace,
whereas the organizational scheme of the Java APIs was original, and others creating a similar
organizational scheme would likely structure it differently. The Federal Circuit likely overemphasized the
creativeness in designing the structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs. On the other hand, the
declaring code is far more creative than the APIs organizational scheme, and thus, likely deserves more
than a thin copyright as to any of the declaring code’s non-functional elements. As stated by the Federal
Circuit, Oracle had an unlimited amount of options when creating its declaring code; for example, instead
of using the word “max” in its code, it could have used the word “larger” or “greater.”246
The U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit was also correct to apply the
Second Circuit’s “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test to the copyrightability of the declaring code and
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the structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs. The Federal Circuit stated that the District Court
failed to apply the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to the copyrightability question, but the Federal
Circuit itself failed to go through the analysis.247 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
endorsed the abstraction-filtration-comparison test as the proper approach, and because the Federal
Circuit is required to apply Ninth Circuit law in the case at hand, the Federal Circuit should have
performed the test’s lengthy analysis.248 Because the Federal Circuit failed to properly analyze the copied
material at issue under the abstraction-filtration-comparison test, the Federal Circuit may have allowed
aspects of the declaring code and structure, sequence, and organization of the APIs to be deemed
protected under copyright when they should have been deemed uncopyrightable. Computer programs are
in essence, functional, but that does not mean that creativity does not go into designing a computer
program. The Third Circuit’s view that functional aspects of a computer program are copyrightable, so
long as there are multiple ways to express it, is overly broad and would allow almost all functional
aspects to be copyrightable, which would inhibit creativity. The First and Sixth Circuit’s view that
functional aspects are not protectable by copyright is too narrow. Many functional aspects in a computer
program have underlying creative non-functional aspects deemed uncopyrightable if using this approach.
The Ninth Circuit’s abstraction-filtration-comparison is in between the two opposing views. Since the
abstraction-filtration-comparison test allows certain creative non-functional aspects within functional
aspects of a computer program to be copyrightable, it appears to be a better approach to the
copyrightability of elements in a computer program.
The U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s conclusion was accurate when
it found that the district court performed the merger analysis on the incorrect timeframe. The merger
analysis does not apply at the time an infringer copies the work, but at the time the author created the
work.249 In the Federal Circuit’s conclusion, it was correct in stating that the merger analysis did not apply
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because there were multiple ways that the declaring code could have been expressed at the time it was
created. The district court concluded that there was only one way to write the declaring code, but the
district court failed to consider that the programmer could have expressed it in multiple ways when the
programmer created the code. The district court’s conclusion is akin to saying that there is only one way
of pressing the keys to type the word “computer” on a QWERTY keyboard; it is the only way because the
creator set up the keys in a particular way when the creator created the QWERTY keyboard. However,
suppose a person were to look at how to press the keys to create the word “computer” at the time of
creation. In that case, the creator could have set up the keys in a variety of combinations. Only after the
creator expressed the QWERTY keyboard’s keys in the creator’s particular way did the way of pressing
the keys to type the word “computer” become the only way to do it.
What the Federal Circuit Likely Got Wrong
While the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit may have gotten some
things correct, the Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit also got some things wrong.
First, the Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the law on the standard of
review for fair use and the court’s conclusion on that law was starkly incorrect. The Federal Court appears
to have incorrectly analyzed a case where the Supreme Court explained how to determine a mixed
question of law and fact as it applied in a bankruptcy proceeding.250 The Federal Court incorrectly stated
that the Supreme Court opinion in U.S. Bank National Ass’n ex rel. CWCaptial Asset Management LLC v.
Village at Lakeridge, LLC is “the standard of review . . . in connection with any mixed question of law
and fact.”251 However, a person reading the Supreme Court’s opinion could identify that certain aspects of
the opinion related only to bankruptcy proceedings.252 For example, when the Court discussed “historical”
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facts, it identified that it was regarding bankruptcy.253 Because the Federal Circuit misconstrued the
Supreme Court’s opinion, it deemed that only the historical facts were entitled to a deferential review
while any other facts that the jury found were merely advisory. This is incorrect as all factual findings by
a jury on review should be treated with deference. The Federal Circuit’s standard of review allowed it to
make its own findings of fact, which ultimately led to a finding that Google’s use of the copyrighted
material was not fair.
The U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s fair use analysis was mistaken.
In the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the first factor, the purpose and character of the use, the court looked
at commerciality and transformative use. While the Federal Circuit’s finding that Google’s use was
commercial was likely correct, it placed too much emphasis on its commerciality, stating that it was
“overwhelmingly commercial.”254 The downfall of not merely the first-factor analysis but the entire fair
use analysis was the Federal Circuit’s finding that Google’s use was not transformative. The Federal
Circuit started by stating that, according to Ninth Circuit law, whether a work is transformative is a
question of law255—that is incorrect. The Ninth Circuit never analyzed transformation as a question of
law. The Ninth Circuit merely stated that whether a work is a parody is a question of law.256 In deciding
that Google’s use was not transformative as a matter of law, the Federal Circuit gave flawed reasoning.
One reason the Federal Circuit provided for why Google’s use was not transformative was that “it does
not fit within the uses listed in the preamble to [17 U.S.C.] §107,”257 however, that list is not allinclusive.258 Another reason the Federal Circuit determined Google’s use was not transformative was that
it served the same purpose in both platforms.259 This reason is unpersuasive. The Federal Circuit failed to
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consider the work as a whole, and instead, looked only at the copied material. Google reimplemented the
declaring code and structure, sequence, and organization of API packages from the Java platform, which
platform Sun created to work on desktop computers.260 Google used what it copied in a transformative
way, including using its own implementing code, which allowed the copied material to work in an
environment that they could not work before, the touchscreen mobile smartphone.261 Furthermore, the
Federal Circuit failed to consider Google’s stated purpose for using the declaring code and the structure,
sequence, and organization of thirty-seven of Oracle’s API packages, to attain a degree of interoperability
with the Java platform, which would make it easier for programmers to use both the Java and Android
platforms. Reasonable jurors could have found that Google’s use was transformative and that the
transformative use was enough to overcome that the use was commercial. The first-factor analysis should
have weighed in favor of a finding of fair use.
While the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s analysis on the second
factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, is correct, the Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal
Circuit’s comment that the factor “has less significance to the overall analysis” is not.262 The Supreme
Court has stated that courts are not to treat the statutory factors in isolation and that courts should consider
all factors and “the results weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”263 The second factor
may, at times, have less weight than the other factors, but it is not less significant than the other factors. If
the factor was not important, why would Congress include it as a factor that courts must consider when
determining fair use?
The U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the third factor, the
amount and substantiality of the copyrighted work used, is without merit. Instead of looking at the portion
used from the copyrighted work as a whole, the Federal Circuit looked at the amount of code necessary to
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write in the Java language, finding that Google copied more than necessary.264 However, that is not what
a court looks at for this factor. Google copied only a small amount of code when looked at in proportion
to the total amount of code in the Java platform.265 Although the Federal Circuit found this factor neutral,
the court also said that it could also weigh against a finding of fair use. Because the amount of code that
Google copied was small in proportion to the total amount of code in the Java platform, and, according to
Google, it copied no more than what was necessary “to preserve inter-system consistency in usage,” even
if the factor does not weigh in favor of a finding of fair use, the factor should not weigh against a finding
of fair use; thus, the factor should be neutral in the analysis.266
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit’s analysis of the fourth
factor, the effect on the market for the copyrighted work, is overstated. The Federal Circuit stated that “no
reasonable jury could have concluded that there was no market harm to Oracle from Google’s
copying.”267 While there was evidence that Android produced actual market harm to the Java platform, as
shown by Amazon renegotiating a better deal on a license with Oracle, a reasonable jury could have
found that the market harm was not severe. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit reasoned that there was
potential market harm as Java has the right to enter the smartphone market.268 However, that market was a
market that they already attempted to enter. A different version of the Java platform, Java Micro
Edition,269 was in mobile phones, but revenue from that platform had declined.270 Furthermore, because
Sun made the Java API free under an open-source license, the jury could have found that there could be
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no market harm as the Java API was already free.271 Therefore, the Federal Circuit should have found
only minimal market harm to Oracle.
Reweighing all factors, the U.S. Supreme Court will likely find that the Federal Circuit should
have found that Google’s use of the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of thirtyseven of Oracle’s API packages as fair.
IV.

Conclusion
Free reimplementation of software interfaces has been an important long-standing practice for

software innovation. Given this long-standing practice in the software industry, the Supreme Court likely
will not completely upend the industry by ruling that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and
organization of API packages are protected under copyright and that Google’s use of those was not fair.
The Supreme Court could simply hold that the Federal Circuit did not properly apply the correct
standard of review for the fair use defense and remand the case to the appellate court to apply the correct
standard of review. However, this ruling is not likely as it would allow other similar disputes to percolate
up to the Supreme Court and provide no more clarity to the uncertainty faced in the field of copyrights in
computer programming.
Given the line of questioning asked by the Justices during the oral argument, the Supreme Court
will likely find that the declaring code and the structure, sequence, and organization of thirty-seven of
Oracle’s API packages are protectable under copyright law. However, the Supreme Court will likely find
that Google’s use of the copyrighted material was fair. This ruling would not wholly upend the software
industry as courts could still find fair use when programmers reimplement software interfaces. However,
it would create more litigation to determine whether a programmer’s use of the reimplemented interfaces
was fair.
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